Gary A. Tobin
(1949-2009)

Gary A. Tobin was one of the first to see the dangers of the new antisemitism on American college campuses and one of the strongest voices in resisting it.
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Resentment Reloaded: How the European Radical Right Mobilizes Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism

Lars Rensmann*

Radical right parties have successfully mobilized voters in Europe in the last few years. Yet, empirical studies of the radical right’s political ideology are scarce. This article offers a comparative analysis of party platforms and political mobilizations of relevant radical right electoral competitors. It reveals not only cross-national variations but also an emerging transnational and modernized ideological profile: the combination of anti-immigrant politics with fierce opposition to cultural and economic globalization, and especially an increasing presence of antisemitism. Corresponding radical right mobilizations are engendered by three favorable conditions: social demand, a changing public climate, and crises of globalization that feed into persistent resentments and anti-Jewish conspiracy theories. Antisemitism has not been replaced by other resentments; instead, the new radical right plays its part in an evolving a new antisemitic international.

Key Words: Radical Right, Counter-Cosmopolitanism, Antisemitism, Anti-Muslim, Anti-Zionism, Anti-Immigrant

THE ANTISEMITISM OF THE RADICAL RIGHT

Established parties in advanced European democracies face the persistent challenge of new and modernized radical right parties. They also epitomize challenges to Europe’s politico-cultural cosmopolitanization (Beck and Grande 2007) and the developing multi-level polity of the European Union at large (Kitschelt 2007; Mudde 2007). In fact, Europe’s transformation from predominantly ethnic-nationalist self-understandings to the broad recognition of cosmopolitan diversity and inclusion of minorities has come a long way. But it also remains contested and conflict-ridden, as contemporary controversies over immigration policy and anti-immigrant politics indicate. The same can be said about European antisemitism and its legacy.

New radical right parties can be viewed as part of that contestation, while their mobilization success varies and is often dependent on contextual factors (Arzheimer 2009). To a large extent, these parties are politically discredited actors and marginalized in European party systems; they also succeed, however, in mobilizing voters in many regions across Europe, and...
they often have direct and indirect political leverage (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007). To be sure, their partly dramatic electoral successes (See Table 1) and electoral performances fluctuate in most contexts and are more difficult to predict than those of their party system competitors. In several cases, however, they are not marginal any longer but even have become junior partners in elected democratic governments (Fröhlich-Steffen and Rensmann 2007). This includes the heart of Western Europe. Think of the Lega Nord in Italy—one of the European Union’s original six members. In Eastern Europe, the radical right party Jobbik, with its strong ties to neo-Nazis and its own paramilitary organization, gained 17% in the 2010 general parliamentary election in Hungary (Hockenos 2010), a country now

**Table 1: Electoral results of relevant* extreme-right parties in parliamentary elections in fifteen European countries, 1984-2010.**

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<td>FPÖ (Austria)</td>
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<td>DF (Denmark)</td>
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<td>PP (Norway)</td>
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<td>NPD (Germany)</td>
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<td>REPs (Germany)</td>
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<td>SNS (Slovakia)</td>
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<td>VMRO-BND (Bulgaria)</td>
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<td>FN (France)</td>
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<td>BNP (Great Britain)</td>
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<td>Jobbik******(Hungary)</td>
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<td>16.67</td>
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<td>LPR (Poland)</td>
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<td>7.9-8.0</td>
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<td>Samoobrona (Poland)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>PURN (Romania)</td>
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<td>PRM (Romania)</td>
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*Although consistently below the 3% threshold, which we take as a minimum level to classify as relevant, the NPD and the BNP are included as relevant parties because of the regional success and parliamentary representation (NPD) and their success in the 2009 European parliamentary elections and their subsequent parliamentary representation in case of the BNP.

**In 2008, AN no longer competed independently but under the umbrella of “Il Popolo della Libertà.” It is also no longer classified as “extreme right.”

****LPF dissolved and did not compete in the 2006 election.

*****On an electoral platform with two other small parties.

*******Jobbik was founded as a political party in 2003; in the 2006 elections it ran with MIÉP, which had previously gained 5.5% in the 1998 and 4.4% in the 2002 elections, turning the radical right into a consistently relevant competitor.

*******PURN dissolved and did not compete in the 2008 election.
governed by a national-populist party (Fidesz) facilitating coded antisemitism and courting anti-Jewish voters.

Of fifteen European Union member states examined, six countries of the radical right have reached a new peak within the last election cycle (2006-2010). The still widespread claim that the radical right has remained an isolated force or become completely irrelevant within the European Union is therefore difficult to sustain, even if we only looked at electoral results and neglect that the radical right is also a significant social movement and subculture. However, while the radical right has recently been recognized as a force to reckon with—in fact, the radical right is the most scrutinized European party family today (Mudde 2007)—there is still a striking void in systematic comparative studies of the radical right’s political ideology, especially of its role in antisemitism.

The radical right’s anti-immigrant resentments, and especially anti-Muslim campaigns, have come under public and scientific scrutiny in recent years (Mammone 2011). Yet, antisemitism as an ideological factor in mobilizing radical right voters has neither been systematically examined in scholarly research nor received much media attention, in spite of some heated scholarly meta-controversies about “new antisemitism”—that is, the partial or full convergence of radical right, radical left, and Islamist antisemitism in the form of hatred of Israel and the chimera of “world Zionism.” While there are some notable exceptions—studies that explore the radical right and antisemitism (e.g., Rensmann 2008; 2011; Weitzman 2006; 2010)—public and scholarly debates, in fact, often presuppose that antisemitism is an ideology that is past its expiration date, and thus also without significance in the radical right’s political and ideological mobilizations. Indeed, it is a widely shared belief in contemporary European publics that antisemitism has largely dissipated, and generally become socially and politically irrelevant—even though such claims are difficult to substantiate and contradict social research findings. If antisemitism surfaces as a problem today, it is frequently suggested that it is instrumentalized and overused, presumably constituting an ubiquitous political charge allegedly employed by Jewish and Israeli lobbies in order to suppress dissent and fence off criticism of Israel in Europe and the United States (see, for instance, Walt and Mearsheimer 2008; for a scholarly critique of these

1. Strangely complementary to such biased presuppositions, some scholars who critically examine the rise of new forms of antisemitism, and who plausibly substantiate the new antisemitism’s thesis about a partial left/right/Islamist convergence on the Jewish question and the Israel question, at times tend to view the contemporary radical right as an irrelevant and marginal player, and thus also have turned away from the empirical study of antisemitism in the radical right.
claims, see Lieberman 2009a, 2009b). In a similar vein, some scholars and political pundits have suggested that the European radical right, with its anti-Muslim vigor, has turned pro-Israel and pro-Jewish (Bunzl 2007), and that Jewish organizations, in turn, now allegedly support the radical right and xenophobia. Moreover, it has become popular to view Muslims as the Jews of today, a trope that insinuates that Muslims are the subject of forms of systematic persecution in Europe that is similar to those that Jews have faced in European history; and a trope that suggests that islamophobia has generally replaced—not just complemented—antisemitism, i.e., hatred of Jews, in 21st-century Europe.

2. Such claims, based on scarce evidence if any, also have political ramifications: if Jews are linked to or associated with the European radical right and with fascist ideology, they are discredited, along with their possible support of the Jewish state of Israel. As will be shown, the Belgish Vlaams Belang may well be the only relevant radical right party who has seriously tried—and failed—to court Jewish voters.

3. If antisemitism is no longer viewed as an acute challenge, it is also easier to suggest that those who do address the issue are playing the antisemitism card for political purposes, presumably to immunize Israel from criticism or to advance particular Jewish interests. Over the last years, some media and scholars across the Atlantic have popularized the claim that Islamophobia is the new antisemitism (as opposed to those theories about new antisemitism that seek to conceptualize a new convergence of radical right, radical-left, and Islamist hatred of Jews and Israel), and thus resentments—unquestionably significant—against Muslims and Islam have taken antisemitism’s place in Europe and beyond (Bunzl 2007; Guarnieri 2010). Yet, it is also popular to suggest that this presumed change is not recognized. While “anti-Semitism is recognized as an evil, noxious creed, and its adherents are barred from mainstream society and respectable organs of opinion,” Islamophobia is presumably widespread and well respected (Oborne 2008). This proposition is problematic in at least three ways: First, it suggests that antisemitism is always publicly identified as such and publicly refuted; while overt racial and Nazi antisemitism has indeed long become largely illegitimate in mainstream public discourse, it can be questioned how far this applies to more subtle or coded forms and anti-Jewish stereotypes. The meaning of the term Islamophobia is equally unclear: does it entail, for instance, criticism of Islamism and criticism by Muslims and non-Muslims against politicized religious practices, or does it signify racial hatred and discrimination against Muslims, which is a contemporary challenge? Second, the assumption that antisemitism is barred from public life and replaced by presumably legitimate Islamophobia suggests that antisemitism has become irrelevant, although all existing survey data show that antisemitic resentments are far from isolated. Moreover, violent attacks against Jews, Jewish institutions, and synagogues continue to exceed—in actual numbers—those against all other minorities (although there are various national exceptions in the case of violence against gypsies), including violence directed against Muslims, Muslim institutions, and mosques. Third, while Jews and Muslims are subjected to
Looking at contemporary radical right ideology and its political context, this article challenges the aforementioned propositions. It claims that while racialized hostility against Muslims takes an important role in many radical right mobilizations alongside general anti-immigrant resentment, antisemitism remains an integral, indeed in many cases reinforced, element of new radical right ideology. For much of the European radical right, however, antisemitism continues to function as a constitutive, persistent conspiracy ideology to explain the modern world and its crises. New radical right parties thereby tend to modernize their ideology in order to increase their appeal, even though overtly racialized stereotypes of Jews, ethnic minorities, and immigrants—as well as Holocaust revisionism—continue to surface in political campaigns; the alleged powerful conspirators of world Jewry, for instance, are today often called “world Zionists.”

In general, the word *Zionist* is increasingly being used as a synonym for Jew to make antisemitic attacks on world Jewry sound respectable. Among the radical right and beyond, the *chiffre*—the Zionists—has generally become the main code for the Jews in antisemitic discourses. It allows blurring the boundaries between legitimate political critique, innuendo, and overt antisemitism while still mobilizing resentments—and also helps avoid potential legal prosecution. In this ideological construct, Jews and the Zionists seek to dominate the world, orchestrate Zionist-Occupied Governments (ZOG) behind the scenes, and personify globalism and global modernity, including American and Zionist imperialism, the global financial system, and global capitalism.
Furthermore, it is suggested that the radical right’s political antisemitism does not harm their political mobilizations but, on the contrary, feeds into an increased public legitimacy of hostility against Jews; a hostility that is fueled by social perceptions of the Middle East conflict and widespread hatred of Israel as well as recent globalization crises. Such resentment marches in step with, and complements, anti-immigrant resentments and prejudices against ethnic minorities.

In the following section, we summarize findings of qualitative content analyses of radical right party manifestos and public campaigns in order to establish the constitutive features of the European radical right’s contemporary ideology, which we summarize in comparative findings. We then look at the demand side, the general political context, and favorable conditions for radical right mobilizations of resentment, focusing especially on the neglected resurgence of political antisemitism and the origins and causal mechanisms thereof.

A Seven-Nation Sample

Here, we examine seven European national cases of radical right party mobilization and ideology based on a comparative study of 11 countries altogether. The study focuses on platforms and manifestos of relevant radical right parties, including public statements by leaders, party Web pages, and political campaigns as components shaping the political ideology of the European radical right. Special attention is paid to the modernization of radical right party ideology. This includes the radical right’s responsiveness to counter-cosmopolitanism, and the way it modifies its propaganda against blacks, immigrants, and Muslims, and particularly the role old-fashioned and modernized antisemitism plays in radical right mobilizations.

Poland

Success of the two most relevant extreme-right parties in Poland—the extreme right League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin—LPR) and the national-protectionist agrarian-populist party Samoobrona, led by Andrzej Lepper—has been fluctuating, along with the still unconsolidated and fluid Polish party system in its entirety. Both parties had temporarily

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4. Summaries of the other qualitative content analyses have been discussed elsewhere (Rensmann 2011).

5. We classify parties as relevant that at least have shown some level of electoral success, that is, scoring at least temporarily 3% or more in regional or national elections.
significant electoral success in the first half of the 2000s: In the 2001 landslide parliamentary elections, the LPR, just created before the elections, received 7.9%; Samoobrona, previously lacking electoral success, received 10.2% and became the third-strongest party in Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament. Both parties repeated their success in 2005 (8.0% LPR; 11.3% Samoobrona). While the LPR is also anchored in the ideologies of the nationalist prewar movement Endecja and Polish Catholic fundamentalism, it links those traditions with contemporary issues, modernized antisemitism, and anti-globalization rhetoric in the core of party ideology. In the first election campaign, LPR attacked President Aleksander Kwasniewski of bowing to Jewish interests (Pankowski and Kornak 2005, 159). In its successful 2005 campaign, the party combined national protectionism with economic protectionism against globalization and mobilized the national solidarity of a new IV Republic of Poland against privatization robbery (Kostrzebski 2005, 220ff.), thereby finding support among globalization losers. Moreover, the LPR unconditionally opposes European Union membership, which it characterizes as anti-Christian (Kostrzebski 2005, 214). After 2005, however, the party lost its initial support of some powerful Catholic civil society agents and media such as Radio Marija, which is connected to the Schiller Institute of the antisemitic U.S. billionaire Lyndon LaRouche (Gazeta Wyborcza, March 9, 2005). The agrarian-populist Samoobrona party lacks Catholic rhetoric, or a similarly distinct radical right and antisemitic programmatic profile. Yet, in spite of socialist economic policy orientations, the party can be classified as populist radical right, and it also nurtures a combination of authoritarian ethno-national populism, anti-immigrant resentments, and antisemitism, which is characteristic for both old and new radical right party ideology. Party leader Lepper, for instance, publicly glorifies democratic dictatorship, the Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels, and the French radical rightist Jean-Marie Le Pen (Pankowski and Kornak 2005, 160). While Goebbels represents the old fascist/Nazi and antisemitic right, Le Pen represents, as Piero Ignazi (2003) has pointed out, the prototype of the new extreme or radical right. Samoobrona modernized its ideology, distanced itself from right-wing extremism, and received dramatic electoral gains in return. The party now focuses on political isolationism and a national-protectionist anti-globalization and anti-European Union platform, though there are links to open antisemitism through the personnel of the party elite (http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2005/poland.html).

While their new ideological formulas and political mobilizations have proven successful in reaching out to broader parts of the disenfranchised electorate, their short performance as junior partners in government in 2006-2007 was not: in response to party scandals and the unwillingness to
agree to new elections, turnout for both parties collapsed at the ballot box in 2007 (1.3% LPR; 2.5% Samoobrona) and they had to leave the Sejm. Roman Giertych stepped down as LPR party leader; neither party recovered from this slide in the 2009 European elections. In terms of ideological supply-side transformations, however, both parties exemplify (a) the turn to “counter-cosmopolitan modernization” and (b) subsequent electoral success.

Hungary

MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja-Hungarian Party for Justice and Life) has been the electorally most successful radical right party in post-Communist Hungary but faded in relevance in recent years. Under the authoritarian leadership of István Csurka, the party promotes exclusivist nationalism and expansionist ambitions, especially with regard to the Hungarian ethnic minority under foreign rule (www.miep.hu). The 2002 national electoral campaign particularly focused on an interrelated set of anti-globalization, antisemitism, anti-Communism, and anti-Israel issues. Initially viewing any cooperation with the West as part of a U.S.-Zionist plan, MIÉP continues to oppose European Union membership and promotes a distinctly anti-Jewish anti-globalization ideology: bankers, for instance, are portrayed as a bunch of Jews sucking the money of average people. Viewing cosmopolitan Judeo-Bolshevik plutocrats and cosmopolitanism and globalization as the main enemy, the party has explained electoral successes of the left and allegedly ongoing Communist rule by referring to Jewish-Zionist activity (Stephen Roth Institute 2002). According to Csurka, Hungarians are being exploited and oppressed by Jews, who dominate the economy and literature. He also fears a Jewish conspiracy, whose perpetrators are sitting in New York and Tel Aviv (cited in Bos 2011). Antisemitism and hatred of Israel are the core elements of this extreme ethno-nationalist party, while resentment against minorities (or Muslims) is part of the party ideology but less central to its identity.

The party, however, has continuously lost votes since 1998 (5.5%) (2002: 4.4%). By 2006, electoral support for MIÉP was down to 2.2%, in spite of the fact that it formed an electoral alliance with the initially even more radical Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary), and it virtually dissolved. Jobbik had taken MIÉP’s place as the most significant political and electoral extreme-right force in Hungary, and outperformed MIÉP. By 2008, the now independent Jobbik was already at 7% in national polls, and the party initially received a stunning 14.77% of the vote in the 2009 European elections. This turned Jobbik into the third strongest party in Hungary, gaining three seats in the European Parliament.
It consolidated this position in the Hungarian party system by mobilizing an average of 16.67% of the voters in the two rounds of the 2010 national elections.

Replacing MIÉP without being less radical in its ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, and especially antisemitism, Jobbik has managed to gain wider electoral appeal after its separation from MIÉP. Jobbik’s current chairman is the young historian Gábor Vona, the modern face of the party, and its best-known and most popular politician is the human rights lawyer and law professor Krisztina Morvai. Though Morvai, the head of Jobbik’s EP delegation, had worked as a women’s rights advocate at the United Nations and also has a strong record in anti-Israel advocacy, her leadership role in this radical right, extremely nationalistic party took many by surprise, and it instantaneously helped Jobbik gain broader legitimacy in spite of its radical platform and the catering to militant fascists.

Jobbik’s campaign platform for the 2010 electoral campaign declared the reunification of the Hungarian nation, the rebuilding of Greater Hungary from before 1919, and thus the redrawing of Hungary’s borders, to be the first priority and the party’s most important political goal—a radical right, nationalist, and expansionist claim that could ultimately be the cause for a war with its European neighbors. It shows very little political constraints and fosters an agenda of radical orientation and rhetoric that openly attacks gypsies and Jewish capital. Its propaganda, along with a certain political symbolism, is clearly reminiscent of the NYKP, or Hungarists—Hungary’s Nazi party, which ruled in Hungary during the Nazi occupation between 1944 and 1945 and which established a ruthless terror regime that collaborated in the Holocaust (Maegerle 2009).

Jobbik’s slightly more strategic mobilization focus is nostalgic Hungarian nationalism opposition to globalism in its economic, political, and cultural dimensions. Along with the leadership role of a feminist human rights lawyer, its fashionable opposition to globalism, the European Union, and foreign investment may turn the party into a prototype of a counter-cosmopolitan, modernized radical right party that seeks to mobilize both nationalist core constituencies of radical right voters and a broader spectrum of globalization losers. While all the indicators of counter-cosmopolitan ideological transformation are prevalent and highly significant, however, the party neither sacrifices its traditional fascist ideology and self-declared radicalism (www.jobbik.com) nor certain demonstrated militancy—both of which, however, do not seem to alienate voters anyway.

In 2007, Jobbik created the Magyar Gárda Kulturális Egyesület (Cultural Association of the Hungarian Guard). The Hungarian Guard is, along with the movement by the same name, a paramilitary, uniformed street militia with sworn-in members designed “to awaken the active self conscious-
ness of the nation”; in 2009, the guard was prohibited. Jobbik has never shied away from radical nationalist, racist, and antisemitic rhetoric. We find party-affiliated publications that employ inflammatory rhetoric against Jews, Roma, and gays. Party members are also linked to anti-Roma and antisemitic violence (Freeman 2009).

Jobbik also proposes the creation of a national special police unit to deal with gypsy delinquency. While the party is open to militant Christian Hungarian nationalism and radicalism displayed by subgroups of the party and segments of the party-elite level, it effectively broadened its appeal and transformed its party ideology and identity; first and foremost, this entailed a strategic major focus on opposition to globalization and Europeanization. Reaching out to various disenfranchised segments of the Hungarian electorate, the modernized party platform is still dedicated to a combination of anti-globalization views and coded popular antisemitism, alongside its previous support of Christian values, Hungarian nationalism, and attacks on Roma and other ethnic minorities. Serving both radical nationalists and disillusioned voters, Jobbik’s economic policies are primarily directed against “the neoliberal ideology dominated policies during these years under the name of privatization, liberalization and deregulation” (Jobbik 2009), while it also rejects the Lisbon treaty and European integration. In this way, Jobbik is capitalizing on increasing joblessness, corruption crises, and social unrest caused by the global economic crisis. In light of widespread economic and cultural fears, the party mobilizes political and cultural resentments not only against pro-European and pro-cosmopolitan elites and minorities but also against multinational corporations, America, and Israel—i.e. globalism, imperialism, and international institutions.

Jobbik’s rise indicates that there is considerable legitimate political space for such counter-cosmopolitan, nationalistic, and antisemitic views in Hungarian politics. Its success, in fact, is accompanied by a broader right-wing nationalist turn in Hungarian politics. Challenging conventional wisdom about electorates and their spatial representation in the party system, there seems to be no tradeoff between party constituencies supporting xenophobia and nationalistic claims. On the one hand, due to various factors—including major corruption cases—the left-center Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP), which was the major governing party for most of the post-Communist period, collapsed at the 2010 national elections, scoring only 19.3%. Severely weakened, MSZP is now barely the biggest opposition party. On the other hand, the national populist FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz—Magyar Polgári Szövetség) gained 52.73% of the vote in 2010. Thus, it achieved an absolute majority that equipped the party with a 2/3 majority in the national parliament and with the governmental power to make sweeping changes to the legal system.
The national-populist FIDESZ, led by the populist prime minister Viktor Orbán since its inception, also campaigns against anti-national elements. While FIDESZ is less radical than Jobbik and combines various political constituencies in its policies, it also provides a government that is apparently sympathetic to radical nationalism and antisemitic resentment. Without being penalized by the party, FIDESZ member of parliament Oszkár Molnár, for instance, stated: “I love Hungary, I love Hungarians, and I prefer Hungarian interests to global financial capital, or Jewish capital, if you like, which wants to devour the whole world, but especially Hungary.” Molnár, who also suggests that there is an Israeli conspiracy to colonize Hungary, found widespread support, even though FIDESZ represents a government that ratified an authoritarian media law severely restricting freedom of speech under the pretense of fighting hate speech.

Hungary’s restrictive media laws and poor civil rights record as well as discrimination policies have increasingly come under scrutiny by the European Union. However, it may also be a sign of the times and of a new assertiveness of the populist and radical right in Hungary and across Europe with regard to both xenophobia and antisemitism that Jobbik can flourish and that even politicians of the ruling party also mobilize resentments against Jews and gypsies without facing effective political opposition. The Cultural Institute of the Republic of Hungary, operating under the auspices of the FIDESZ government, today initiates discussions about what they call the “Jewish problem” and how to deal with it. It is doing so in Germany, that is, as part of transnational Hungarian cultural policy (Balassi Institute 2011).

Another sign of public collaboration with the radical right and the legitimacy of ethnic nationalism and antisemitism in Hungary is the fact that the mayor of Budapest, István Tarlós, recently appointed István Csurka, the leader of MIÉP, and the nationalist György Dörner as the directors of the Hungarian capital’s prestigious New Theater, despite concerns by Jewish groups and international condemnation. The new directors want to rename the theater and act against what they call “the degenerate sick liberal hegemony,” and they demand that only Hungarian drama is performed and want to stop what they refer to as “foreign garbage,” which is viewed as a code word for Jewish and other non-Hungarian productions (Bos 2011).

Slovakia

The most relevant radical right party in Slovakia, Slovenska Narodna Strana—SNS (Slovak National Party), has made attempts to modernize its ideological profile as well. SNS describes itself as a modern, national, conservative, right-wing, Christian parliamentary party (www.sns.sk). Accord-
ing to three programmatic pillars, it also seeks to transcend the left-right cleavage by claiming to be socialist, an ideological aspect that helped its promotion to become junior partner in the socialist center-left government led by Smer, which is part of the Party of European Socialists of mainstream European social-democratic and socialist parties. The coalition government, which makes the SNS the only Eastern European radical right party in a national government of a European Union member state, was formed after the 2006 parliamentary elections, when SNS scored 11.7%, its strongest showing since the first post-Communist election in 1990. Yet, in spite of its partially modernized image, its electoral success, and its assumed respectability as member of a government in the European Union, SNS hardly disguises its simultaneously radically ethnic-nationalist ideological orientation and its successful creation of sustainable bridges to its radical right core constituencies. The party explicitly praises radicalism, Slavic brotherhood, and the original Slovak culture on its Web sites and in its party platform. It also continues to promote xenophobia and barely coded antisemitism (People Against Racism & Milo 2005, 213ff). Even the name SNS points to its roots in a Slovak radical nationalist party of the 19th century. Contrary to other modernized radical right parties, it does not distance itself from fascist and antisemitic roots but seeks, in fact, to rehabilitate Jozsef Tiso’s fascist war regime, which collaborated in the Holocaust. Tiso is portrayed as a martyr in the fight against Bolshevism and liberalism (People Against Racism & Milo 2005, 213ff; http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2008/slovakia.html).

Thus, while the SNS does adapt to new issues—initially, it primarily mobilized for national independence from the Czech Republic—its ideological modernization is very limited. Its core agenda is determined by conventional Slovak ethnic nationalism, which marches in step with both anti-immigrant racism and antisemitism; globalization is not a central campaign issue or a major factor shaping any ideological reorientation. While the party attacks the European Union and supports both cultural/national and economic “socialist” protectionism, it is successful enough and not in need of modernizing its image, especially in times of a larger European Union crisis. Its campaigning is aimed at law and order issues, which are combined with overt discrimination and attacks against ethnic minorities, especially the Hungarian minority and Rom people—which, according to the SNS, are criminals who should be sterilized (People Against Racism & Milo 2005, 214; http://www.sns.sk). The racist ideological profile of this anti-liberal radical right government party certainly creates problems for

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6. The party had been in government for the first time under the populist HZDS and Vladimir Meciar between 1994 and 1998.
European Union anti-discrimination guidelines and the European Union’s cosmopolitan image and legitimacy.

Italy

While the Alleanza Nazionale, successor to the fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), can no longer be classified as right-wing extremist (Ignazi 2003), the only relevant extreme-right party in Italy is the separatist Lega Nord (LN) under the leadership of Umberto Bossi. The party is currently a junior partner in the Berlusconi administration as the only Western European extreme-right party in government. After some internal crises and programmatic shifts, the LN has turned to counter-cosmopolitan identity populism (Betz 2002). Opposition to economic, cultural, and political globalization has become its major campaign focus.7 While for the LN regionalist separatism and the fight “for the people of the North” remains the major objective, the Lega Nord per l’indipendenza della Padania continues to support the creation of the fictional state of Padania and separation from southern Italy. It has adjusted its program accordingly, molding it into its anti-Southern racism, which is also still characteristic for the party (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro 2001).

Recently, the LN began to specifically target Muslim immigrants and illegals, responding and reinforcing current public discourses. It claims that Italians live on a reservation like Native Americans, and calls for a stop of the invasion by immigrants (www.leganord.org). The party’s participation in government, its focus on identity politics, and the mobilization of new popular resentments against globalization helped to regain electoral successes. After its modest reform and as a junior partner in government, the LN recovered from its poor electoral results of the early 2000s, receiving 4.6% in the 2006 national parliamentary elections and 8.3% in 2008. The party’s radical opposition to cultural globalization is more modest in economic terms, but it is supplemented by strong anti-European Union statements, anti-immigrant rhetoric, and modernized antisemitism. The latter, however, is primarily limited to statements by politicians rather than evident in party platforms and programs. On a local level, the party collaborates with the openly antisemitic, neo-Nazi Forza Nuova (www.eumc.eu.int 2004; Caiani & Parenti 2009).

7. In the 1990s, Bossi began focusing on globalization, attacking “materialism” and the “evil high finance controlling all economic power by means of globalization” as main enemies (Die Presse, October 20, 1999).
Austria

The Austrian radical right Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich—FPÖ), which was by far the most successful radical right party in Western Europe and the second strongest party in the Austrian parliament, experienced electoral seesaws over the last ten years since it joined the government as a junior partner in 2000. After its split into FPÖ and BZÖ (Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs—Alliance for the Future of Austria) and the departure of its charismatic populist leader Jörg Haider, the party kept an ethnic-nationalist and antisemitic ideological profile. However, popular opposition to the European Union in favor of “Austrian patriotism” and “independence” (www.fpoe.at), populist calls for referenda, and anti-establishment rhetoric and economic national protectionism against globalization have also been its modernized ideological focal points for more than a decade.

In recent years, the FPÖ further focused its ideological message and effectively responded to new issues while keeping some of its hard-line ideology. In the 2008 electoral campaign, it demanded a halt to immigration, a ministry for repatriating foreigners, and the return of powers conceded to the European Union (www.fpoe.at). The party now mobilizes popular resentments, especially against Muslims (for instance, party leader Strache campaigned for a ban on Islamic dress)\(^8\); it also articulates anti-imperialist anti-Americanism and antisemitism in global politics. By such emphasis on both modernized anti-Muslim xenophobia and antisemitism, the party almost doubled its vote (www.elections2009-results.eu/en/austria_en.html) in the European elections after a campaign “against European Union accession of Turkey and Israel” (www.derstandard.at, May 21, 2009).

To be sure, Israel has never been under consideration for candidacy. The combination of ethnic-nationalist populism and effective counter-cosmopolitan mobilizations against the foreign forces Turkey and Zionism consolidated the party’s electoral success (17.5% in the 2008 parliamentary elections, in addition to 10.7% of the radical right competitor BZÖ).

The UK

The British National Party (BNP) has moved from the extremist fringes to becoming the first radical right party in British history to win seats in a national vote, namely, in the 2009 European elections. Agenda

\(^8\) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/austria/3097540/Austria-election-delivers-gains-for-far-Right.html.
changes seem to have come to fruition here: The new success can be viewed as a reflection of its programmed modernization, trying to appear more respectable (“suits not boots” strategy), and its reorientation toward a counter-cosmopolitan ideology. This entails a focus on protection of national identity, anti-European Union positions, opposition to the Europhiles and the hypocrisy of the liberal elite and its multicultural experiment, national economic and cultural protectionism against globalization, workfare instead of welfare, and—last but not least—an anti-immigrant policy outlook that especially targets Muslims (www.bnp.org.uk; Goodwin 2007).

The undisputed party leader and chairman, Nick Griffin, attacks the “Islamification of the West”; Britain’s becoming an Islamic state or like Africa; Islamofascism; and the vicious faith of Islam (BBC News, July 16 2004; www.timesonline.co.uk, November 11, 2006). The party primarily combines issues of inner security with anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant resentment, leading to apocalyptic scenarios such as: Europe is sooner or later going to have to close its borders or it is simply going to be swamped by the Third World (www.bnp.org.uk). Yet, the party also attacks European Union policy and the “European Union’s moves on Iran,” and the anti-imperialist dictatorship of the Islamic Republic. The BNP modernizes and at times downplays its antisemitism, but Griffin, for instance, has never distanced himself from his Holocaust denial—he refers to the Shoah as “Holohoax.”

France

Similar transformations could be observed in case of the Front National (FN), the prototype of the new radical right. The FN has been the model for many other European radical right parties because it was able to respond to, as well as frame and generate new issues and thereby modernize its ideological image in a way that appealed to, new potential voters. In the past, it was among the first to mobilize Euro-skepticism, address the representation crisis, launch attacks against immigration, and exploit anti-establishment effects (Ignazi 2003, 95ff.). While the party’s anti-globalization rhetoric and national protectionism, including protectionist economic policies and attacks on multinational corporations, became conspicuous during the 1990s, it was relegated to a less prominent role in recent years. Today, antisemitism, in its overt or coded variations, is present but secondary in the FN and its campaigns. Still, party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen openly displays

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his friendship with the actor Dieudonné M'bala M'bala and supports his Islamic fundamentalist, anti-Israel, and antisemitic viewpoints.

The main issue for the FN today, however, is immigration. This dominant issue is linked to the “primacy of the French” (www.frontnational.com) in opposition to multicultural diversity, cosmopolitanism, new Muslim minorities, and cultural globalization. Though it had long benefitted from its powerful party leader Le Pen, the party’s dramatic loss in the 2007 election (4.29%) may be attributed to some program modernizations initiated by his daughter Marine Le Pen. An anti-establishment campaign poster during the 2007 electoral campaign featuring an immigrant complaining about the “usual suspects of politics” may have been too much to swallow—and too much “modernization” of the party image for some of the FN right-wing core constituencies. Even if not central to the party’s recent campaigns, Holocaust relativity and antisemitic innuendo remain an essential part of the party’s ideological fabric.

RESENTMENTS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT: COMPARATIVE FINDINGS

In sum, the comparative analysis of party ideologies and mobilizations discloses a partly heterogeneous picture. Political contexts and context-dependent variables play a significant role, and campaigns are hardly unified transnationally; in part, they respond to specific national issues and electoral demands. Even though ideological priorities and mobilizations vary, however, there are some prevalent ideological features that have emerged, and that overall characterize the contemporary European radical right.

First, all radical right parties share a high level of xenophobia and anti-immigrant resentment. Immigrants are blamed for all kinds of economic and social woes, as well as for a loss of cultural identity. In particular, this resentment is currently often—though by no means exclusively—directed against Muslim immigrants and, depending on the country, specific ethnic minorities. Such resentment, which is intimately related to an opposition to cosmopolitan diversity, expresses an ethnic nationalism and collective self-understanding that remains a constitutive core feature of the European radical right. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. In Eastern Europe, anti-Muslim prejudice plays only a marginal role, if any, in public mobilization of the radical right. Hungary’s Jobbik, the most successful radical right party in Europe, is predominantly antisemitic and also discriminates against Rom; Muslims are largely irrelevant in campaigns.

Second, several relevant European radical right parties, while retaining an ethnic-nationalist ideological profile, have also partly become transna-
tional in their outlook. They claim to defend a “Europe of nations” against cosmopolitan influences and immigration; multinational corporations; and global political norms and institutions, including European Union governance. Some parties develop a significantly modernized, radically counter-cosmopolitan, anti-globalization identity (Mudde 2007) that reflects widespread counter-sentiments in the electorate. The counter-cosmopolitan defense of cultural particularism includes, but is not limited to, national particularism.

Third, and intimately related to the second feature, is that antisemitism remains a core element of radical right ideology, old and new. In several cases, there is even a noticeable resurgence of antisemitism, at times coded in radical anti-Israel resentments, “world Zionism” or foreign influence, and conspiracy theories. Such antisemitic mobilizations are often directly linked to the anti-globalization discourse, whereby Jews are identified as the key agents of cosmopolitan cultural change, global power, and the global financial or economic system. Jews, once again, serve as a personified, reified world explanation.

The demonstrable relevance and revival of antisemitism in radical right ideology, to be sure, is at odds with popular perceptions of the radical right. Moreover, some premature scholarly claims that antisemitism has virtually disappeared from new radical right mobilizations and as a mobilizing resource due to its allegedly bygone appeal, runs counter to our findings. Instead, we see the contours of an emerging, new ideological combination that couples domestic resentment against Muslims with hatred of Jews and opposition to cosmopolitan norms and the cosmopolitanization processes; in several cases, Israel, world Zionism, and Israel lobbies have become the primary target in the radical right’s view of foreign affairs—an ideology that engenders support for radical Islamist’s terror against Jews and Israel abroad, even though Muslim immigrants are not accepted as equal members of society.

BACK BY POPULAR DEMAND: COUNTER-COSMOPOLITANISM, XENOPHOBIA, AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Before we explore several hypotheses to explain why such an ideological combination, and the resurgence of antisemitism in particular, may be an effective mobilizing tool in party systems of the contemporary European Union, we have a close look at the changing political climate and the increased popular demand for counter-cosmopolitan, xenophobic, and antisemitic politics. It is displayed in continuously widespread, in part

10. This should not be misunderstood as any kind of lexical ordering.
increasing resentments against Jews, Muslims, and immigrants; an increased public and political salience of these subjects and related issues; and economic and socio-cultural globalization crises that tend to embolden and help intensify previously existing antisemitic undercurrents, including reified perceptions of globalization and the cosmopolitanization of societies as “Jewish machinations.”

**Increased Resentments**

PEW data indicate a strong relationship between anti-Jewish and sentiments against Muslim immigrants. Indeed, in six European countries included in the PEW survey, the correlation between unfavorable opinions of Jews and unfavorable opinions of Muslims is remarkably high (neg .80; PEW 2008). Overall, negative views of Muslims have increased over a four-year period; exceptions are Spain and Germany, where negative views of Muslims are nevertheless still high (52% and 50%, respectively).11 Moreover, there has been considerable progress in the cosmopolitanization of European societies, i.e., the diversification of European societies and the recognition of cosmopolitan diversity and norms. Yet, there is still a considerable segment of the electorate that is hostile to immigrants and the sociocultural change they represent. Largely overlooked in public debates, antisemitism has surged and resurged in Europe since the turn of the century (see Table 2). Antisemitism is a far cry from being merely a historical legacy. Instead, empirical data show that antisemitic attitudes remain an undercurrent—even if varying in scope and intensity—among parts of European societies. Not only that: surveys indicate that such resentments are now more prevalent than in previous decades and they matter more to certain segments of voters. Antisemitism, like xenophobia, is no marginal minority opinion at the fringe of society.

11. A 2009 study on group-focused enmity conducted by researchers from University of Bielefeld in Germany finds, however, that hatred of Muslims to some extent decreased, while, according to this study, hatred of Jews and homosexuals is growing. The level of resentment against most minorities declined—sexism and racism even considerably, resentments against Muslims slightly, while the percentage of people who believe “that there are too many Muslims” in their country is still especially high in those countries that actually have a low percentage of Muslim minorities. According to the study, 41.2% of Europeans believe that “Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era,” and 45.7% of respondents supported the contention that Israel in general “is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians,” thereby equating the Jewish state with the genocidal Nazi regime and reverting colonial and Holocaust-related European guilt to the Jews (Stricker 2009).

On average, antisemitic attitudes have been on the rise in Europe since 2000, although there are fluctuations and considerable cross-national variations. Moreover, hatred of Israel and “Zionists” has become a medium to express hatred of Jews. Forms of radical anti-Zionism, wishing for the destruction of the Jewish state and the de-Zionization of the world, may also be motivated by secondary antisemitism (Rensmann 1998): the desire to morally demonize Jews because they are living reminders of the German and European atrocities committed against them during the Nazi era. Equating the Zionists with Nazis is a way to project one’s guilt and settle an old score. According to a seven-country survey, including the most populous European member states, almost every second European (45.7%) uses Nazi associations and comparisons when thinking of Israel—i.e., they somewhat or strongly agree that “Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians,” while 37.4% agree that “considering Israel’s policy, I can understand why people do not like Jews” (Zick 2009, 13).

**Increased Awareness**

Antisemitism and hostility against Muslims have become more prominent issues to the public, in politics, and in modern media. The latter, anti-Muslim hostility, seems to benefit from certain media debates about mosques and the alleged introduction of Sharia law. In recent years, to be
sure, political and public discourse in Europe is also characterized by a high level of awareness and alertness in the face of anti-Muslim campaigns or statements. For instance, a best-selling book by a former German politician, Thilo Sarrazin, which includes blatantly xenophobic, racialized anti-Muslim claims, was subjected to scathing criticism across the German public and its political class. After the terrorist acts by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011, this public debate about anti-Muslim hostility reached a new peak, and anti-Muslim radical right groups such as Stop the Islamization of Norway (Stopp islamiseringen av Norge—SIAN) have come under renewed, particular public scrutiny. Anti-Muslim resentments have increasingly become scandalized in European publics, and at least parties associated with anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim resentments have recently lost electoral support—for example, the national populist Progress Party of Norway has suffered significant losses in local elections in the aftermath of the Breivik’s acts of terror.12

However, while the public focus has shifted on anti-Muslim prejudices—which remains a controversial subject from which the radical right might draw long-term gains—radical right parties can also benefit from an increasingly legitimate public discourse that is hostile to Jews. This aspect has been neglected in recent research: We observe an expanding zone of acquiescence in relation to antisemitism, which also finds reflection in the radical right, that has hardly been recognized yet in research on the subject. This increased legitimacy or public tolerance of anti-Jewish resentment is characterized by changing boundaries in what is a respectable conversation about Jews and Zionists. It also finds expression in the rise of conspiracy theories, which often directly lead to a reservoir of antisemitic images of Jews allegedly pulling the strings and controlling the world. Furthermore, antisemitism is also nurtured by a popular Manichean world view

12. On the one hand, some critics of Islam in European public discourse tend to conflate political Islamism with private religious practices and downplay existing racist discrimination against Muslim immigrants. On the other hand, many critics of Islamophobia conflate these distinctions as well by suggesting that all criticism of Islamism and of Islamic rule is illegitimate, prejudiced, and driven by hatred—including criticism from Muslims and secularized citizens with Muslim background who oppose pious interpretations of Islam in Europe and abroad. In this logic, which centers on blasphemy rather than the discrimination of individuals and the violation of individual rights, the Islamophobia charge has also been misused. It can function as a sweeping brush against dissidents criticizing the discrimination of women and gays in the name of Islam, or of radical Islamists’ genocidal antisemitism. In its most extreme version, it is used by radical Islamists to block off criticism of anti-gay, anti-feminist and antisemitic statements by claiming that such criticism would be Islamophobic.
that is not necessarily antisemitic in itself but helps create a climate of anti-
Jewish hostility, and has increasingly gained traction in European publics. It
portrays the two countries in which most of the world’s Jews live, the
United States and Israel, as the main—if not the only—villains of world
politics and of the world economy, while letting brutal dictatorships and
repressive regimes across the world off the hook. Anti-Israel sentiments and
anti-Zionism that go far beyond criticism of the Israeli government and its
policies are in most cases no longer discredited as illegitimate resentments
against another group or country but have become a badge of honor even
among publicists and politicians on the left who otherwise tend to support
anti-discrimination policies and universal human rights (Hirsh 2007; Mar-
kovits 2011; Rensmann/Schoeps 2011; Wistrich 2010).

In its radical version, this Manichean world view manifests itself in
publicly articulated stereotypes about war-mongering Zionists and a glo-
ally powerful Israel lobby that dominates governments and stifles free
debate about Israel’s atrocities against innocent peoples, especially the
Palestinians. Such claims go hand in hand with a wide-spread immunization
strategy in the form of antisemitism denial that reaches deep into the public
and the political left; in this view, antisemitism today is a generality rele-
vant only insofar as it is seen as a spurious charge that the Zionists or the
pro-Israel lobby would throw at critics of Israel (Hirsh 2007, 73). Flanked
by the claim that criticism of Israel cannot be antisemitic (cited in Hirsh
2007) and the belief that if there is any antisemitism it is Israel that causes
its emergence,13 there are highly emotionalized boycott campaigns across
Europe exclusively directed against the Jewish state. These campaigns are
emboldened by widely popular charges that Israel is an apartheid regime
that deserves to be dismantled.14 Singling out Israel as the pariah among the
nations, such aggressive demonization of the Jewish state goes far beyond

13. Of course, criticism of Israeli policies does not have to be antisemitic. Often
it is not. There can, however, be antisemitic “criticism” of Israel, just as there can
be racist criticisms of African or Arab countries. It is equally implausible, and
prejudiced, to claim that an African regime is the “cause” for racist perceptions of
Africans as it is to say that Israel is the “cause” for antisemitic perceptions of Jews.

14. Under Israeli law, Arab Israelis, who constitute 20% of the nation’s mul-
ticultural citizenry and is equally represented at Israeli universities, have the same
civil and political rights as Jews and Christians (unlike Palestinians in Syria, for
instance). Israel hardly resembles the South African apartheid regime with which it
is often compared. It is, in fact, a safe haven for Arab gays and religious minorities
such as the Baha’i. Most striking is the double standard of the “apartheid” charge,
which indicates more than a biased predisposition: countries that systematically
discriminate against, indeed persecute, ethnic and religious minorities and violate
human rights, such as Iran or Sudan, are not subjected to similar boycott
campaigns.
any rational criticism, and the simultaneous denial of the problem of antisemitism is not limited to the radical right. Anti-Israel demonstrations resonate in public segments across the political spectrum and in civil society, including left-wing student and teacher unions and media. More often than not, such aggressive anti-Zionism slips into overt antisemitic stereotypes and resentment. For instance, the left-leaning British newspaper the 
Guardian recently published an article in which journalist Deborah Orr claimed that the Israel-Hamas prisoner swap—Hamas released the captured soldier Gilat Shalit in exchange for the release of 1,000 Palestinians responsible for the death of 600 Israelis, most of the victims women and children—gave evidence that Israel nurtures a supremacist Jewish self-understanding of being a “chosen” people whose lives are worth a thousand times the lives of others (Orr 2011).15

There is, at any rate, a noticeable erosion of more rigorous discursive boundaries—about what is tolerated as part of public discourse and what is classified or scandalized as hate speech—with regard to Jews and Zionists, boundaries that had evolved in postwar Europe. The most recent indicator of antisemitism’s renewed public toleration, if not legitimacy, is the fact that the extreme nationalist, radical right LAOS party, with its chairman, Georgios Karatzaferis, is part of the new Greek coalition government that was established in response to the European debt crisis. LAOS, claiming to represent the “true Greeks” instead of “Jews, homosexuals, and Communists,” particularly campaigns against Jews and Israel. The party received 7% of the vote in the last national election. Karatzaferis is a professed Holocaust denier who hates Israel and is known for his openly antisemitic statements. After the 9/11 attacks in New York, he posed the question: “Why were all the Jews warned not to come to work that day?” before the Greek parliament. Karatzaferis also questions the “tales of Auschwitz and Dachau.” During Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Karatzaferis said that the IDF was acting “with savage brutality only seen in Hitler’s time towards helpless people” (Uni 2011).

15. In this case, the editor of the 
Guardian was forced to publish an unusual “apology” three weeks later, in which he recognizes that “‘Chosenness,’ in Jewish theology, tends to refer to the sense in which Jews are ‘burdened’ by religious responsibilities; it has never meant that the Jews are better than anyone else. Historically it has been antisemites, not Jews, who have read ‘chosen’ as code for Jewish supremacism.”
Crises of globalization have provided a fertile climate for mobilizations of resentments against immigrants and Jews that portray them as responsible for social problems. Personifying the origins of theses crises in immigrants, foreign capital, and particularly Jews, the radical right can tap into—and strengthen the link between—existing social resentments and current multifaceted crises of global modernity. In particular, the identification of Jews with globalism and cosmopolitan political, economic, and socio-cultural transformations corresponds to what we call counter-cosmopolitanism, that is, the generalized, particularistic opposition to the combined set of political, cultural, and economic transformations associated with globalization and cosmopolitan value change (Markovits and Rensmann 2010; Rensmann 2011; Rensmann & Miller 2010).

Counter-cosmopolitanism, as the unqualified rejection of all forms of sociocultural, economic and political globalization as well as cosmopolitan norms and diversity, is likely to become more prevalent during crises of globalization. Counter-cosmopolitan parties, which generally oppose globalization and the cosmopolitanization of society (Beck and Grande 2007), seek to strategically mobilize those citizens who identify with the national community, citizens from economic strata that have traditionally been protected by the nation-state and now find themselves increasingly exposed to foreign competition, and those who lack the cultural competence to meet the economic and cultural challenge of a globalizing world (Kriesi et al. 2006).

While counter-cosmopolitanism bolsters hostility against immigrants and cultural change, it particularly predisposes toward hostility against Jews. As a form of a reified critique of globalization, such generalized counter-cosmopolitanism is highly susceptible to conspiracy theories that invoke the old social image of the cosmopolitan, wandering Jew. In antisemitic narratives, Jews have traditionally been identified with modernity, cosmopolitanism, and globalism. Jews or Zionists are now often charged with cosmopolitan social change, global wars, and global domination, cultural diffusion, the global erosion of the nation-state, dual loyalty, and capitalist crises. It is, after all, one of modern antisemitism’s distinct features to function as an objectified explanation of the modern world. In this ideology, Jews are seen as the embodiment of these cultural and eco-

16. This rejection is part and parcel of, but not limited to, nationalistic attitudes; it can also entail religiously or culturally grounded motivations, and it can be expressed transnationally in its own organizational outreach or political alliance-building.
onomic modernization processes (including immigration), and as the ones who orchestrate them. In a world of abstract domination-governed complex, abstract, and anonymous social relations, the antisemites present the world’s problems as a Zionist scheme. The widespread uneasiness in the changing world society of postmodernity and in the global village can therefore be projected onto the image of Jews. Even if such projection is not framed as a global Jewish conspiracy, global problems are often squarely blamed on the Zionists and their allegedly disproportionate Jewish political and media influence through powerful, secret Israel lobbies and Holocaust industries ruling politics domestically and in world affairs.

CONCLUSION

Based on an analysis of contemporary radical right party platforms and mobilizations, we have shown that there is continuity and change in the political ideology of relevant radical right parties in Europe: a focus on anti-immigration issues and anti-Muslim resentment is accompanied by virulent antisemitism. Contrary to common perceptions, this antisemitism remains an integral part of the radical right’s political identity and mobilizations. While anti-Muslim resentments often matter, the claim that antisemitism has been “replaced” by other resentments cannot be substantiated; it is equally invalid that the European radical right has largely turned pro-Israel (Bunzl 2007). Instead, most of the radical right prominently features modernized, “anti-globalist,” and “anti-Zionist” antisemitism. Cross-national variations notwithstanding, antisemitism has gained in importance. This is especially the case among the most successful radical right parties in Eastern and Western Europe, such as Jobbik (Hungary), LAOS (Greece), and FPÖ (Austria), in many instances, radical right parties cater to broader counter-cosmopolitan constituencies. Thus, a modernized ideological profile tends to emerge: it combines xenophobic resentment against immigrants and European Muslims with a counter-cosmopolitan agenda and antisemitism domestically, as well as modernized anti-Zionist antisemitism in foreign affairs. Even though Muslim immigrants are rejected domestically, radical Islamists may hereby gain radical right sympathies for their struggle against world Zionism.

These mobilizations and transformations on the radical right supply side are supported by a set of favorable conditions. Radical right parties express an evident electoral demand by catering to significant counter-cosmopolitan constituencies that harbor resentments against social and cultural change in general, and immigrants and Jews in particular. Moreover, they benefit from a broader European public climate in which certain anti-immigrant resentments surface, and in which especially forms of modernized
antisemitism (Rensmann and Schoeps 2011) have become increasingly respectable and tolerated. Finally, the radical right is one of several agents that seeks to exploit current European and globalization crises that affect European citizens, such as the European financial debt crisis, and that feed into persisting anti-Jewish undercurrents and conspiracy theories. These crises can also be seen as crises of cosmopolitanism that help engender counter-cosmopolitan responses, including hostility against immigrants and Jews.

The radical right’s resurgent and reloaded politics of paranoia in Europe find a special target in Jews and Zionists. The new and modernized radical right, emulating the old, hereby plays its part in an emerging new international antisemitism. In particular, the often neglected, and at times denied, revival of antisemitism in radical right party ideology and beyond epitomizes, both on the political demand and supply side, what can be conceived of as situated in a deeper political crisis in Europe. The broader resurgence of antisemitism can be theorized as an anti-modern, counter-cosmopolitan response to rapid economic and cultural change and current crises in the 21st century. Part and parcel of—but far from being limited to—the radical right, there are indicators that this reaction has begun to move from the fringes into the center.

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